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I

N DIRECT DEMAND SYSTEMS, THE QUANTITIES AND PRICES

of goods are usually
treated as endogenous and exogenous, respectively, while in inverse demand
systems the opposite occurs. For the mixed demand problem, goods are partitioned into two groups, with the quantities and prices of goods in, say, group one
treated as in a direct demand system, and the quantities and prices of goods in group
two treated as in an inverse demand system. Thus, in mixed demand systems, quantities of the goods in the first group and the prices of goods in the second group are
specified as functions of prices in the first group and of quantities in the second group.
The mixed demand problem has been studied by Samuelson (1965), Heien
(1977), and Chavas (1984), among others. Approaches to estimate mixed demand
models have been suggested by Barten (1992) and Moschini and Vissa (1993). In the
Moschini and Vissa study, a mixed differential demand model based on the cost
function was estimated, with adding-up, homogeneity, and symmetry imposed at a
point, the sample mean. In the Barten study, the direct differential demand or
Rotterdam model (Theil 1965, 1975; Barten 1966) was estimated by modifying the
maximum likelihood method to account for the mixed endogenous prices and
quantities; in turn, these estimates were used to calculate those for the mixed demand
specification.
This chapter examines mixed demand by combining the direct and inverse
Rotterdam demand specifications (for discussion of the inverse Rotterdam model, see,
for example, Barten and Bettendorf 1989, or Brown and Lee 1995). Instead of working through the cost function as in the Moschini and Vissa study, we work with the
underlying direct and indirect utility functions as in Samuelson’s study. A feature of
this approach is that the model coefficients can be directly related to these utility
functions, allowing various restrictions stemming from the structure of preferences to
be straightforwardly examined (e.g., separability and uniform substitutes – Theil 1971,
1975, 1976, 1980a, 1980b).
In the next section, we develop a fundamental equation for the mixed demand
problem. This equation is then used to develop a mixed Rotterdam model. A parameterization is proposed and general demand restrictions are examined. We then show
how the model embeds the direct and inverse Rotterdam specifications as special
cases. Specific restrictions for the mixed Rotterdam model are also discussed; elas-
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ticity formulas are provided; a levels version is specified; and, in the last section, an
empirical application is discussed.
Consumer-Choice Problem for Mixed Demand

M

and inverse
demands (Chavas 1984), and this relationship is used in specifying our mixed
demand system. Partitioning goods and corresponding prices into groups a and b, consider (i) the conditional direct demand problem of choosing the quantities of goods in
group a given that prices in both groups and quantities in group b are fixed, (ii) the
conditional inverse demand problem of choosing the prices in group b given that
prices in group a and quantities in both groups are fixed, and (iii) the mixed demand
problem of choosing the quantities in group a and the prices in group b given that the
prices in group a and quantities in group b are fixed, that is,
IXED DEMAND IS CLOSELY RELATED TO CONDITIONAL DIRECT

Conditional Direct Demand Problem:
max
qa

u(q a ,q b ) ,

(1a)

subject to πa′qa + πb′qb = 1;
Conditional Inverse Demand Problem:
max
πb

-ψ (πa , πb ) ,

(1b)

subject to πa′qa + πb′qb = 1;
Mixed Demand Problem:
max
q a , πb

u(q a ,q b ) − ψ( πa , πb ) ,

(1c)

subject to πa′qa + πb′qb = 1;
where u(.) and ψ (ψ) are the direct and indirect utility functions, respectively; qa and
πa are vectors of quantities and normalized prices, respectively, for group a; and qb
and πb are vectors of quantities and normalized prices, respectively, for group b.
Normalized prices are actual prices in the two groups, pa and pb, divided by total
expenditure or income x; that is, πa = pa/x and πb = pb/x. Note that for the mixed
demand problem, the objective function u(qa , qb) - ψ(πa , πb) = 0 at the optimum;
otherwise, the value of this function is negative. The direct utility and indirect utility
functions are assumed to be quasi-concave and quasi-convex, respectively. For each
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problem, any number of goods can be included in either group, including all goods in
group a or b, which results in either the unconditional direct or inverse demand
problem, respectively. Mixed demand problem (1c) was originally formulated by
Samuelson (1965).
The first-order conditions for mixed demand problem (1c) are
∂u/∂qa = λπa,

(2a)

∂ψ/∂πb = -λqb,

(2b)

πa′qa + πb′qb = 1,

(2c)

where λ is the Lagrange multiplier (λ = ∂u/∂log x or income times the marginal utility
of income1), and ∂u/∂qa and ∂ψ/∂πb are vectors of partial derivatives of the direct and
indirect utilities functions with respect to quantities and normalized prices, respectively. Except for the Lagrange multiplier, (2a) and (2c) are also the first-order conditions for the conditional direct demand problem (1a), while (2b) and (2c) are the firstorder conditions for the conditional inverse demand problem (1b).
The solutions to the first-order conditions are2
Conditional Direct Demand Equations:
qa = qa(πa , πb , qb ),

(3a)

λa = λa (πa , πb , qb );
Conditional Inverse Demand Equations:
πb = πb(πa , qa , qb ),

(3b)

λb = λb (πa , qa , qb );
Mixed Demand Equations:
qa = qa(πa , qb ),

(3c)

πb = πb(πa , qb ),
λ = λ(πa , qb ).
1

In actual prices, the Lagrangian function (L) for problem (2) with all goods in group a can be written
as L = u(qa, qb) + λ0(x- pa′qa - pb′qb), where λ0 = ∂u/∂x (see, e.g., Phlips 1974). Hence, dividing and multiplying the budget constraint by x results in L= u(qa, qb) + λ(1- πa′qa - πb′qb), where λ = λ0x.
2
A unique solution is assumed to exist, but exceptions, notably those involving Giffen goods, are possible, as discussed by Chavas (1984) and Samuelson (1965).
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Fundamental Equations

T

matrix equations for the
mixed demand problem and two conditional demand problems (the counterparts
to Barten’s [1964, 1966] fundamental matrix equation for the unconditional direct
demand problem) and to determine the effects of prices and quantities in terms of the
underlying utility functions.
Total differentiation of first-order conditions (2a), (2b), and (2c) results in
HE NEXT STEP IS TO DEVELOP THE FUNDAMENTAL

Uaa dqa = λdπa - Uab dqb + πa dλ,

(4a)

Ψbb dπb = -Ψab dπa - λdqb - qb dλ,

(4b)

πa′dqa + qb′dπb = -qa′dπa - πb′dqb,

(4c)

where Uaa = ∂2u/∂qa ∂qa′ ; Uab = ∂2u/∂qa ∂qb′ ; Ψbb = ∂2 ψ/∂πb ∂πb′ ; and Ψab = ∂2ψ/∂πb
∂πa′ are second partial derivative matrices. Equations (4a), (4b), and (4c) are the fundamental matrix equations for the mixed demand problem. Except for the Lagrange
multiplier, (4a) and (4c) are also the fundamental matrix equations for the conditional
direct demand problem, and (4b) and (4c) are the fundamental matrix equations for
the conditional inverse demand problem.
Differential Demand Equations

F

(4a), (4b), and (4c) can be solved in terms of the
price and quantity partial derivatives of demand equations (3a), (3b), and (3c).
These derivatives are shown below in context of the total differentials of the demand
equations.
UNDAMENTAL EQUATIONS

Conditional Direct Demand:
dqa = (∂qa/∂πa′)dπa + (∂qa/∂πb′)dπb + (∂qa/∂qb′)dqb,

(5a)

dλa = (∂λa/∂πa′)dπa + (∂λa/∂πb′)dπb + (∂λa/∂qb′)dqb,
Conditional Inverse Demand:
dπb = (∂πb/∂πa′)dπa + (∂πb/∂qa′)dqa + (∂πb/∂qb′)dqb,
dλb = (∂λb/∂πa′)dπa + (∂λb/∂qa′)dqa + (∂λb/∂qb′)dqb,

(5b)
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Mixed Demand:
dqa = (∂qa/∂πa′)dπa + (∂qa/∂qb′)dqb,

(5c)

dπb = (∂πb/∂πa′)dπa + (∂πb/∂qb′)dqb,
dλ = (∂λ/∂πa′)dπa + (∂λ/∂qb′)dqb.
The following steps for solving the fundamental equations in terms of these
derivatives are provided to develop the relationship between mixed and conditional
demands. First, inverting equations (4a) and (4b), we find
dqa = λ Uaa-1dπa - Uaa-1 Uab dqb + Uaa-1 πa dλ,

(6a)

dπb = -Ψbb-1 Ψab dπa - λ Ψbb-1dqb - Ψbb-1 qb dλ.

(6b)

Except for λ and dλ, result (6a) is the same for both the conditional direct demand
and mixed demand problems, while result (6b) is the same for both the conditional
inverse demand and mixed demand problems; that is, λ and dλ for mixed demand, λa
and dλa for conditional direct demand, and λb and dλb for conditional inverse demand.
Next solve for dλa, dλb, and dλ – multiply equations (6a) and (6b) by πa′ and qb′
respectively; add the results in the case of dλ; in solving for dλa, substitute -qa′dπa qb′dπb - πb′dqb for πa′dqa, based on budget constraint (4c); in solving for dλb, substitute -qa′dπa - πa′dqa - πb′dqb for qb′dπb; and in solving for dλ, substitute -qa′dπa - πb′dqb
for πa′dqa + qb′dπb; and rearrange terms; that is,
dλa = φa-1(- (λaπa′ Uaa-1 + qa′)dπa - qb′dπb + ( πa′ Uaa-1 Uab - πb′)dqb),

(7a)

dλb = φb-1((qb′ Ψbb-1 Ψab - qa′ )dπa - πa′ dqa + (λbqb′ Ψbb-1 - πb′)dqb),

(7b)

dλ = φab-1((-λπa′ Uaa-1 + qb′ Ψbb-1 Ψab - qa′)dπa + (πa′ Uaa-1 Uab + λqb′ Ψbb-1 - πb)dqb), (7c)
where φa-1 = (πa′Uaa-1πa)-1; φb-1 = (-qb′Ψbb-1qb)-1; and φab-1 = (φa + φb)-1 = (πa′Uaa-1πa qb′Ψbb-1qb)-1; and, assuming U and Ψ are negative and positive definite, respectively
(see Theil 1975 for discussion of this assumption), Uaa-1 and Ψbb-1 are negative and
positive definite, respectively, and hence φa-1, φb-1, and φab-1 are negative. These results show that dλ links the two groups through the second partial matrices for groups
a and b, while dλa and dλb do not.
Substituting Lagrange multiplier results (7) into (6) and rearranging, the conditional and mixed demand equations in differential form can be written as
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Conditional Direct Demand:
dqa = φa-1Uaa-1πa ( -qa′dπa - qb′dπb - πb′dqb) + (λaUaa-1 - λaφa-1Uaa-1πaπa′ Uaa-1)dπa +
(-Uaa-1Uab + φa-1Uaa-1πaπa′ Uaa-1Uab)dqb,

(8a)

Conditional Inverse Demand:
dπb = φb-1Ψbb-1qb(qa′dπa + πa′ dqa + πb′dqb) + (-Ψbb-1 Ψab - φb-1 Ψbb-1qb qb′ Ψbb-1 Ψab)dπa
+ (-λb Ψbb-1 - λbφb-1Ψbb-1qb qb′ Ψbb-1)dqb,

(8b)

Mixed Demand:
dqa = φab-1Uaa-1πa(-qa′dπa - πb′dqb) +
(λUaa-1 - λφab-1Uaa-1 πa πa′ Uaa-1 + φab-1Uaa-1 πa qb′ Ψbb-1 Ψab)dπa +
(-Uaa-1Uab + φab-1Uaa-1πaπa′ Uaa-1 Uab + λ φab-1Uaa-1πa qb′ Ψbb-1)dqb,

(8c)

dπb = φab-1 Ψbb-1qb (qa′dπa + πb′dqb) +
(-Ψbb-1 Ψab + λφab-1Ψbb-1qb πa′Uaa-1 - φab-1 Ψbb-1qb qb′ Ψbb-1 Ψab)dπa +
(-λΨbb-1 - φab-1 Ψbb-1qbπa′ Uaa-1 Uab - λφab-1 Ψbb-1qbqb′ Ψbb-1)dqb.

(8d)

Consider mixed demand equations (8c) and (8d). Any changes in exogenous prices
and quantities (dπa and dqb) must result in changes in the endogenous variables (dqa
and dπb) that satisfy the adding up condition and leaves the objective function, u(qa,qb) ψ(πa , πb), unchanged at zero. Adding up can be verified by multiplying both sides of
equations (8c) and (8d) by πa′ and qb′, respectively, and adding the two results to find
πa′dqa + qb′dπb = -qa′dπa - πb′dqb, which is budget constraint (4c). These changes also
hold the objective function at zero. Differentiating u(qa , qb)- ψ(πa , πb) = 0 results in
(∂u/∂qa′)dqa + (∂u/∂qb′)dqb - (∂ψ/∂πa′)dπa - (∂ψ/∂πb′)dπb = 0; or, using first-order conditions (2a) and (2b) and noting that group subscripts a and b are interchangeable
(Samuelson 1965) gives (λπa′)dqa + (λπb′)dqb - (-λqa′)dπa - (-λqb′)dπb = 0, or λ(πa′dqa
+ qb′dπb) = λ(-qa′dπa - πb′dqb), which, outside of λ, is the budget constraint result
again. That is, the change in utility λ (-qa′dπa - πb′dqb) resulting from the exogenous
price and quantity changes equals the change in utility λ (πa′dqa + qb′dπb) resulting
from the endogenous variable changes. Note that the budget-constraint/utility term
qa′dπa + πb′dqb, except for sign, is part of the first term on the right-hand sides of the
conditional and mixed demand equations, (8a) through (8d). This relationship will be
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used to specify income effects in the mixed demand model similar to those in the conditional models. The term qa′dπa will be transformed into a Divisia price index, while
the term πb′dqb will be transformed into a Divisia volume index.
Mixed Rotterdam Model

F

ROM THE PREVIOUS RESULTS, A LOG DIFFERENTIAL

mixed demand system can
be obtained by (i), multiplying both sides of equation (8c) by π^a and both sides
of equation (8d) by q^b, where the symbol ^ over a vector indicates a diagonal matrix
with diagonal elements equal to the elements of the vector and the off diagonal elements equal to zero; (ii) pre-multiplying dqa on the right-hand side of equation (8c)
by the identity matrix in the form of q^a q^a-1, and pre-multiplying dπb on the right-hand
side of equation (8d) by π^bπ^b-1; (iii) pre-multiplying dπa and dqb on the left-hand sides
of equations (8c) and (8d) by the identity matrices in the form of π^aπ^a-1 and q^b q^b-1, respectively; and (iv) including the identity matrices or unit scalar, π^aπ^a-1, q^bq^b-1, φabφab-1,
and λλ-1, in select locations as shown in the appendix. This mixed demand system can
be written more compactly in terms of individual matrix elements and log changes,
using the relationship dz/z = dlog(z) = Dz for any variable z, as
wai Dqai = - θi DQ + φΣj(θij - θi θj - θi Σs γsΨab*sj)Dπaj +

(9a)

φΣs(-Σj θij Uab*js + θiΣj θj Uab*js + θi γs)Dqbs,
wbr Dπbr = γr DQ + φΣj(ΣsγrsΨab*sj + γr θj + γr Σsγs Ψab*sj)Dπaj +

(9b)

φΣs(-γrs - γrΣj θj Uab*js - γr γs )Dqbs,
where wai = πaiqai and wbr = πbrqbr are the budget shares for good i in group a and good
r in group b, respectively; and
φ = λφab
[wai Dqai] = [wai dlog(qai)] = π^a q^a q^a-1dqa
[wbr Dπbr] = [wbr dlog(πbr)]= q^b π^b π^b-1dπb
[Dπai] = [dlog(πai)] = π^a-1dπa
[Dπbr] = [dlog(πbr)] = q^b-1dqb
[θi] = φab-1π^aUaa-1πa = φab-1 φa φa-1π^a Uaa-1πa
[θij] = φab-1π^aUaa-1π^a
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[γr] = φab-1q^bΨbb-1qb = φab-1φb φb-1q^b Ψbb-1qb
[γrs] = φab-1 q^b Ψbb-1q^b
DQ = Σj waj Dπaj + Σs wbs Dqbs = qa′π^a π^a-1dπa + πb′ q^b q^b-1dqb
[Uab*js] = [λ-1π^a-1Uab q^b]
[Ψab*sj ] = [-λ-1q^b-1Ψabπ^a].
The terms θi and γr are weighted conditional income and scale coefficients. Based
on (8a), the income effects for the conditional direct demands are
∂qa/∂x = -((∂qa/∂πa′)πa + (∂qa/∂πb′)πb)/x = φa-1Uaa-1πa/x.
Hence, the conditional marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) are
p^a ∂qa/∂x = φa-1 π^a Uaa-1πa.
In equations (9a) and (9b), the mixed demand term θi is φa/φab times the ith conditional
MPC, or, equivalently, the good’s budget share times its income elasticity.
The conditional scale effects for (8b) can be determined by considering proportional changes in qa = kqa0 and qb = kqb0, where k is a scalar and qa0 and qb0 are reference bundles. Define a good’s scale coefficient as the good’s budget share times its
scale elasticity. Based on (8b), the conditional scale coefficients are
q^bπ^b(π^b-1k)( ∂πb/∂k) = q^bk((∂πb/∂qa′)qa0+(∂πb/∂qb′)qb0) = φb-1q^b Ψbb-1qb,
and the scale coefficients in (9a) and (9b) are φab-1φb times these conditional scale coefficients. From equation (7), note that the scale and income weights sum to unity, that
is, φa + φb = φab or φa/φab + φb/φab = 1.
The mixed price and quantity coefficients, θij and γrs, are also conditional coefficients times the same MPCs and scale weights, respectively. The term φ can be viewed
as the weighted sum of λaφa and λbφb, with weights λλa-1 and λλb-1, respectively, i.e.,
φ = λφab = (λλa-1) λaφa + (λλb-1) λbφb. The term λaφa is the inverse of the income elasticity of the marginal utility of income for the conditional direct demand problem.
That is, from (7a), (∂λa/∂x)x = φa-1(λaπa′Uaa-1πa + qa′πa + qb′πb) = (λa + φa-1), or
(∂λa/∂x) (x/λa) – 1 = λa-1φa-1. Following footnote 1, λa = λa0 x, where λa0 is the marginal utility of income for the (not normalized) conditional direct demand problem so
that logλa = logλa0 + logx, and ∂logλa/∂logx – 1 = ∂logλa0/∂logx = λa-1φa-1. Similarly from
(7b), (∂λb/∂k) k = φb-1(λbqb′Ψbb-1qb - πa′qa - πb′qb) = (-λb - φb-1), or -(∂λb/∂k) (k/λb) -1 =
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λb-1φb-1 Hence λbφb is the negative of the inverse of scale elasticity of the Lagrange
multiplier for the conditional inverse demand problem minus one.
The term DQ is the Divisia (normalized) price index for group a plus the Divisia
volume index for group b. In equation (9a), -DQ indicates the change in conditional
real income related to conditional direct demand (8a), except for changes in income
related to changes in prices in group b; while, in equation (9b), DQ indicates the
change in conditional real income related to conditional inverse demand (8b), except
for changes in income related to changes in quantities in group a.
The cross-group terms in the mixed demand model can be written as
[Uab*js ] = [(∂2u /∂qaj ∂qbs) (qbs/(λπaj))]
= [(∂2u/∂ (pajqaj) ∂ (pbsqbs)) (pbsqbs/(λ/x))],
and
[Ψab* sj ] = [(∂2ψ/∂πbs ∂πaj) (πaj/(-λqbs))]
= -[(∂2ψ/∂ (pbsqbs) ∂ (pajqaj) ((pajqaj/(λ/x))],
where λ/x = ∂u/∂x. These results show that the term Uab*js is the elasticity of marginal
utility of a dollar spent on good j in group a with respect to another dollar spent on
good s in group b, while Ψab*sj is the elasticity of marginal utility of a dollar spent on
good s in group b with respect to another dollar spent on good j in group a.3 Since the
order of differentiation does not matter, these elasticities are related to each other by
Ψab*sj = -(waj/wbs)Uab*js.
The mixed demand model can also be written as4
waiDqai = -θi DQ + φΣj(Πij - θi Σs γsΨab*sj)Dπaj + φΣs(θi γs -Σj Πij Uab*js )Dqbs, (10a)
wbrDπbr = γr DQ + φΣj(γr θj -Σs αrs Ψab*sj)Dπaj + φΣs(αrs - γrΣj θj Uab*js)Dqbs, (10b)

3

These elasticities are similar to the elasticities used to model advertising in the Rotterdam model
(Theil 1980a; Duffy 1987; and Brown and Lee 1997) and to the second partials used to defined the uniform substitute model (Theil 1980b).
4
Following notation in the literature, both upper and lower case pi are used in defining the model.
Lower case pi continues to be used to define normalized prices (πaj) following notation for inverse and
mixed demand (e.g., Barten 1992, or Barten and Bettendorf 1989), while upper case pi (Πij) is used in
defining the effect of a normalized price following usual notation for the direct Rotterdam model.
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where Πij = θij - θi θj, and αrs = -γrs - γr γs. In empirical work, the coefficients θi, γs, φ,
Πij, or θij, αrs or γrs, and Uab*js (Ψab*sj = -(waj/wbs)Uab*js) can be treated as a constant to
be estimated.
Based on the foregoing derivations, the mixed demand coefficients of equations
(9) and (10) obey the following basic properties:
adding-up:

Σi θi = φa/φab
Σr γr
= 1 + Σr γr
Σi θi - Σr γr = 1 (given φab = φa + φb)
Σi θij = θj
Σr γrs
Σi Πij = Σi θij - Σi θi θj
Σr αrs

= - φb/φab

(11a)

= Σi θi – 1
= γs
= -Σr γrs - Σr γr γs

= θj(1- φa/φab)
= θj φb/φab

= -γs(1- φb/φab)
= -γs φa/φab

= -θjΣr γr

= -γs Σi θi

symmetry:
θij = θji
Πij = Πji

γrs = γsr
αrs = αsr

(11b)

homogeneity:
(proportionate changes in prices):

Σj Πij = Σj θij - θi Σj θj
= θi(1 - φa/φab)
= θiφb/φab
= -θiΣr γr

(proportionate changes in quantities):

Σjγr θj = γr φa/φab
Σs θi γs = - θi φb/φab
Σs αrs = -Σs γrs - Σs γr γs
= -γr(1- φb/φab)
= -γr φa/φab
= -γr Σi θi

(11c)
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negativity:
λφab Σi Σj xi xj θij < 0,

(11d)

-λφab ΣirΣs xr xs γrs < 0,
for any nonzero values of x, when U and Ψ are negative and positive definite,
respectively.
The adding up conditions are based on the budget constraint differential in terms
of logs, DQ = Σj waj Dπaj + Σs wbs Dqbs = -Σj waj Dqaj - ΣswbsDπbs. In empirical studies, infinitesimal changes are approximated by finite changes and specifying DQ =
-Σj waj Dqaj - ΣswbsDπbs allows adding up to be exactly satisfied.5
Direct and Inverse Rotterdam Models

T

as a general model with the
direct and inverse Rotterdam models as special cases. When all prices are given,
equation (9b) or (10b) vanishes and equation (9a) or (10a) becomes the direct Rotterdam model (Theil 1965, 1975; Barten 1966) in normalized prices, that is,
HE MIXED ROTTERDAM MODEL CAN BE VIEWED

wiDqai = θi DQ + φΣj(θij - θi θj)Dπj
or
wiDqai = θi DQ + Σj Πij*Dπj,
where subscript a has been dropped; Πij* = φ (θij - θi θj); and -DQ = -Σj wj Dπj =
Σj wj Dqj. The log change in normalized prices is Dπj = Dpj – Dx; and, given Σj Πij* =
0, the direct Rotterdam model is usually specified by replacing Dπj by Dpj, with
-DxΣj Πij* = 0.
On the other hand, when all quantities are given, equation (9a) or (10a) vanishes
and equation (9b) or (10b) becomes the inverse Rotterdam model (Barten and Bettendorf 1989), that is,
wr Dπr = γr DQ + φΣs(-γrs - γr γs )Dqbs
or
wr Dπr = γr DQ + φΣs αrs Dqbs,
where subscript b has been dropped and αrs* = φ (-γrs - γr γs ).
5

Similarly, in the direct Rotterdam model, the Divisia volume index is used in place of the log change
in money income minus the Divisia price index, as discussed by Theil (1971).
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The restrictions for the direct and inverse Rotterdam models, shown by Theil
(1975, 1980a, 1980b) and Barten and Bettendorf (1989), respectively, among others,
can be derived from the mixed Rotterdam model restrictions (11) by letting φa
become φab in the case of direct demand (φb vanishes), and φb become φab in the case
of inverse demand (φa vanishes).
Specific Restrictions for the Mixed Rotterdam Model

I

(11), various restrictions may be useful
for estimating mixed demand equations (9a) and (9b) or (10a) and (10b). A
natural source of possible restrictions is the direct and indirect utility functions
underlying the model. The mixed Rotterdam model’s price and quantity coefficients
are directly related to these underlying utility functions, and restrictions on the utility
functions can be straightforwardly imposed on the model coefficients. Below, we
consider some specific restrictions, progressing from relatively strong to weak cases.
The strongest restriction considered in this analysis is direct utility, preference independence (Theil 1975, 1980a, 1980b) defined by u(qa, qb) = Σai uai(qai) + Σbr ubr(qbr);
and/or indirect utility, preference independence defined by ψ (πa, πb) = Σai ψai(πai) +
Σbr ψbr(πbr). A straightforward implication of preference independence is that the
cross-group coefficients are zero, that is, Uab*js = 0 and Ψab*sj = 0. For these utility
functions, the off diagonal elements of Uaa and/or Ψaa and hence Uaa-1 and/or Ψaa-1 are
zero, implying additional restrictions on the model’s price and quantity coefficients.
In the case of preference independence of the direct utility function, θij = θij ∆ij, where
∆ij is the Kronecker delta (∆ij = 1 if i = j, otherwise ∆ij = 0), implying θii = θi, given
adding-up condition (11a), that is, Σj θij = θi = Σj θij∆ij = θii. Similarly, in the case of
preference independence of the indirect utility function, γrs = γrs ∆rs and γrr = γr, given
the adding-up condition Σs γrs = γr = Σs γrs ∆rs = γrr. In the case of direct and indirect
preference independence, the mixed Rotterdam model can be written as
N ADDITION TO GENERAL RESTRICTIONS

waiDqai = -θi DQ + φθi(Dπai - Σj θj Dπaj + Σsγs Dqbs),

(12a)

wbrDπbr = γr DQ - φγr(Dqbr - Σj θjDπaj + ΣsγsDqbs).

(12b)

In direct demand specification (12a), the own price change, Dπai, is deflated by
the Frisch group price index Σj θj Dπaj and the Frisch group quantity index Σsγs Dqbs.
This deflation scheme is like that for the direct utility, preference independent model
except that the Frisch price index for group b is replaced by the Frisch quantity index
for group b. The quantity effects for inverse demand specification (12b) are similarly
specified with the own quantity change, Dqbr, deflated by same group price and quan-
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tity Frisch indexes. Note that the income coefficient θi is positive, ruling out inferior
goods, while the scale coefficient γr is negative. (See the definitions of θi and γr, following equation (9b); θi and γr are positive and negative, respectively, given that the
diagonal elements of Uaa-1 and Ψbb-1 are negative and positive, respectively, with the
off diagonal elements equal to zero, and that φab, φa, and φb are negative.)
A somewhat less restrictive model occurs when we have preference independence
between the two groups of goods. That is, if groups a and b are block independent
(Theil 1975, 1976, 1980a, 1980b), Uab*js and Ψab*sj are again zero, but the results that
reduce the parameter space for θij and γrs no longer hold. In this case, the mixed demand equations can be written as
waiDqai = -θi DQ + φΣjΠijDπaj + θi φΣsγsDqbs,

(13a)

wbrDπbr = γr DQ + γr φΣj θj Dπaj + φΣsαrsDqbs.

(13b)

Various block independence, as well as blockwise dependence or weak separability (Theil 1976) restrictions, might also be considered. Such restrictions might apply
to either or both the direct or indirect utility functions. In addition, restrictions like
those underlying the uniform substitute model (Theil 1980b; Brown and Lee 1993,
2000), or, similarly, restrictions on the cross-group coefficients Uab*js and Ψab*sj might
be considered. For example, suppose that the goods within each group are closely related, resulting in Uab*js = κ and Ψab*sj = -(waj/wbs)Uab*js = -(waj/wbs) κ. That is, the elasticity of marginal utility of a dollar spent on good j in group a with respect to another
dollar spent on good s in group b is the same for any two goods j and s. In this case,
equations (10a) and (10b) can be written as
waiDqai = -θi DQ + φΣjΠij Dπaj + θi φΣsγs Dqbs +

(14a)

θi φ κΣs(γs/wbs) ΣjwajDπaj - θi φκ (φb/φab) Σs Dqbs,
wbr Dπbr = γr DQ + γrφΣj θjDπaj + φΣsαrs Dqbs +

(14b)

φκΣs(αrs/wbs) Σj waj Dπaj - γr φκ (φa/φab) ΣsDqbs,
which is the same as (13a) and (13b) except for the additional terms involving κ. We
will refer to model (14) as block dependent model I.
Another example would be that the goods in one group, say group b, are closely related, but that the goods in the other group are not, resulting in Uab*js = κj and Ψab*sj =
-(waj/wbs) κj. That is, the cross-group elasticities between some good in group a and
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all goods in group b are the same; but the elasticities differ across the goods in group
a. In this case, the model can be written as
wai Dqai = -θi DQ + φΣj(Πij + θi Σs (γs/wbs) κj waj)Dπaj

(15a)

+ φΣs(θi γs -Σj Πij κj )Dqbs,
wbr Dπbr = γr DQ + φΣj(γr θj +Σs (αrs /wbs) κj waj)Dπaj

(15b)

+ φΣs(αrs - γrΣj θj κj)Dqbs.
We will refer to model (15) as block dependent model II.
We illustrate models (12) through (15) in an empirical analysis, following
discussion below on model elasticities and a levels version of the model.
Mixed Demand Elasticities

T

HE MIXED DEMAND EQUATIONS, LIKE THOSE FOR

the direct and indirect
Rotterdam models, are in log form with the right-hand side, dependent variable
being either the log change in a good’s quantity or normalized price times that good’s
budget share, and the left-hand side coefficients being the good’s budget share times
various elasticity terms. Hence, the elasticities for a good can be found by dividing
the good’s coefficients by its budget share. These elasticities can be straightforwardly
observed by dividing both sides of equations (10a) and (10b) by the budget share for
the good in question, that is,
Dqai = -(θi/wai) (Σjwaj(Dpaj - Dx) + ΣswbsDqbs) +
(φ/wai) Σj(Πij - θi Σs γsΨab*sj)(Dpaj – Dx) + (φ/wai) Σs(θi γs - Σj Πij Uab*js)Dqbs

and
Dpbr = Dx + (γr / wbr )( Σj waj (Dpaj – Dx) + Σs wbs Dqbs) +
(φ/wbr) Σj(γr θj - Σs αrs Ψab*sj)(Dpaj – Dx) + (φ/wbr) Σs(αrs - γrΣj θj Uab*js)Dqbs,
where the normalized log price changes have been replaced by their corresponding actual
price and income changes (Dπaj = Dpaj – Dx and Dπbr = Dpbr – Dx). The price and quantity elasticities in these equations are uncompensated.
Price and Quantity Elasticities:
Group a

price

εai, aj =

φ (Πij - θi Σs γsΨab*sj)/wai - (θi /wai)waj

quantity

εai, bs =

φ (θi γs - Σj Πij Uab*js )/wai - (θi /wai)wbs
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price

εbr, aj =

φ (γr θj - Σs αrs Ψab*sj)/wbr + (γr/wbr)waj

quantity

εbr, bs =

φ (αrs - γrΣj θj Uab*js)/wbr + (γr/wbr)wbs.

Income and Scale Elasticities:
Group a

Group b

income

εai,x =

-Σj εai, aj

scale

εai,k =

Σs εai, bs

income

εbr, x =

1-Σj εbr, aj

scale

εbr, k =

Σs εbr, bs
Levels Version of Mixed Demand

I

NSTEAD OF DIFFERENCES, MIXED DEMAND SYSTEMS

(9) and (10) can also be
specified in terms of levels, following Barten’s (1989) approach in specifying a
levels version for the direct Rotterdam model. Consider the double log mixed demand
equations
logqai = β0ai + Σj εai, aj logπaj + Σs εai, bs logqbs,

(16a)

logπbr = β0br + Σj εbr, aj logπaj + Σs εbr, bs logqbs,

(16b)

where β0ai and β0br are intercepts.
Multiplying each of these double log demand equations by its corresponding
budget share and using the previously specified mixed demand elasticities gives, after
rearranging terms,
wai logqai = βai - θi(Σj waj logπaj + Σs wbs logqbs) +

(17a)

φΣj(Πij - θi Σs γsΨab*sj)logπaj + φΣs(θi γs -Σj Πij Uab*js)logqbs,
wbr logπbr = βbr + γr(Σj waj logπaj + Σs wbs logqbs) +

(17b)

φΣj (γr θj - Σs αrs Ψab )logπaj + φΣs(αrs - γrΣj θj Uab )logqbs,
*sj

*js

where βai = wai β0ai and βbr = wbr β0br.
Adding up can be imposed on these equations following the approach used by
Barten in specifying his levels Rotterdam model. First, sum equations (17a) and (17b)
across goods, imposing restrictions (11a), and rearrange terms to find
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Σj waj logπaj + Σs wbs log qbs = Σi βai + Σr βbr - Σi wai logqai - Σr wbr logπbr, (18)
which suggests that, for adding up to be satisfied, the right-hand side of (18) might be
considered as the model’s income variable.
That is, substituting the right-hand side of (18) for Σj waj logπaj + Σs wbs log qbs in
equations (17a) and (17b), we find
wai log(qai) = β*ai + θi logQ +
φΣj(Πij - θi Σs γsΨab*sj)logπaj + φΣs(θi γs -Σj Πij Uab*js) log qbs,

(19a)

wbr log(πbr) = β*br - γr logQ +
φΣj (γr θj -Σs αrs Ψab* sj) logπaj + φΣs(αrs - γrΣj θj Uab*js) log qbs,

(19b)

where logQ = Σi wai log(qai) +Σr wbr log(πbr); β*ai = βai - θi (Σj βaj + Σr βbr) and β*br =
βbr + γr(Σj βaj + Σr βbr). Equations (19a) and (19b) are our mixed demand system in
levels, with the coefficients obeying (11) and Σi β*ai + Σrβ*br = 0.
With respect to the above definition of real income, note that by definition we can
write
0 = Σj wai log(πaiqai /wai) + Σr wbr log(πbrqbr /wbr)
or
log Q = -Σi wai log(πai) -Σr wbr log(qbr) + Σi wai log(wai) + Σr wbr log(wbr).
As in the case of Barten’s levels version of the direct Rotterdam model, the last two
terms on the left-hand side of this result, Σj waj log(waj) + Σj wbs log(wbs), may vary
little and be approximately equal to a constant, in which case logQ and our originally
considered real income measure -Σi wai log(πai) - Σr wbr log(qbr) may be highly correlated in empirical analysis.
Application

F

OR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES, THIS STUDY’S MIXED

demand model was applied
to annual data on per capita fresh table fruit consumption and retail prices,
reported in the Fruit and Tree Nuts, Situation and Outlook Yearbook, October 2001,
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The period from 1980 through 2000
was studied. Retail price data for table fruit were reported only for oranges, grapefruit, apples, pears, bananas, and grapes. Reported retail orange prices were for the
navel and Valencia varieties; these two price series were used to construct a weighted
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average retail orange price with the weights based on fresh utilization levels for
navels and Valencias in various issues of Citrus Summary (Florida Agricultural Statistics Service). Apple and pear prices were highly correlated and so these two types
of fruit were combined into one group. The number of fresh fruit categories studied
was thus five – oranges, grapefruit, apples/pears, bananas and grapes. Mean budget
shares for these categories were .18 for oranges, .07 for grapefruit, .35 for
apples/pears, .22 for bananas, and .18 for grapes.
Over the period studied, most of the fresh oranges and grapefruit consumed in the
U.S. were produced domestically; we treat the quantities of these fresh fruit as fixed
in a given year, dependent on the crop size (USDA). On the other hand, nearly all of
the bananas and many of the grapes (over 40 percent in recent years) consumed in the
U.S. are imported; we treat their prices as fixed, dependent on the world market.
Many of the apples consumed in the U.S. are domestically produced, but a significant
amount are imported (7 percent in 2000), and we also treat the price of apples as fixed
in the world market.6 That is, apples, grapes, and bananas are in group a, while the
citrus fruits, oranges and grapefruit, are in group b.
The group of five fresh fruit categories discussed above was treated as separable
from other goods. Hence, the system is conditional on expenditure allocated to the
fresh fruit studied. Following Theil (1975), the infinitely small log changes implied
by the model were measured by discrete changes (logzt - logzt-1; t = time), and average budget shares between time periods ((wit + wit-1)/2) were used. The cross-group
elasticities Ψab*sj = -(waj/wbs)Uab*js were imposed at sample mean budget shares. The
model was estimated by the maximum likelihood method obtained by iterating the
seemingly unrelated regression method. As the data added up by construction, the error
covariance matrix was singular and an arbitrary equation was excluded (Barten 1969);
the parameters for the excluded equation can be obtained using conditions (11) or by
re-estimating the model omitting a different equation. In addition to adding-up, homogeneity and symmetry are imposed as our maintained hypothesis.
Each of the previously discussed restricted mixed demand models was estimated:
preference independent model (12); block independent model (13); block dependent
model I or model (14); and block dependent model II or model (15). Estimates of
these models are shown in Table 1 (see page 21). All the coefficients for preference
independent model (12) had the expected sign – positive income coefficients (θi), negative scale coefficients (γr), and a negative factor of proportionality (φ) – and were statistically significant at the α = .10 level. However, the log likelihood value for this model
is notably lower than for the other models, and the preference independent model in
this case would not be chosen against each of the other models based on the likelihood ratio test at reasonable levels of significance.
6

These assumptions seem reasonable for the time period studied, but with development of world markets for fresh citrus, a growing amount of citrus is being imported into the U.S., and in the future the
exogeneity assumption for oranges and grapefruit may need to be re-examined.
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Except for the cross-price and cross-quantity coefficients, all the coefficients for
block independent model (13) were statistically significant with the expected sign.
However, neither would this model be chosen against block dependent models (14)
and (15) based on the likelihood ratio test.
The signs of the income, scale, price, and quantity coefficient estimates for block
dependent model I are the same as those for model (13), but the t values for several of
the coefficients are lower in this block dependent specification. The estimate of κ (the
elasticity of marginal utility of a dollar spent on a good in group a with respect to
another dollar spent on a good in group b) is negative and significant, indicating that
cross-group effects are important in this case. A one percent increase in the quantity
of a fresh fruit in group b (oranges or grapefruit) is estimated to decrease the marginal
utility of each good in group a (apples, bananas, and grapes) by .49 percent.
The estimates of block dependent model II are similar to those for block dependent model I, except for the cross-group elasticities. Based on the likelihood ratio test
between these models, the restrictions on these elasticities imposed in block dependent model I are not accepted at reasonable levels of significance. The results suggest
that a one percent increase in the quantity of oranges or grapefruit decreases the marginal utilities of bananas, apples and grapes by .79 percent, .58 percent, and .39 percent,
respectively. Overall, the results for models (14) and (15) suggest that a specification
with some type of cross-group relationship is needed to model fresh fruit.
Lastly, elasticity estimates for each of the mixed demand models are shown in
Table 2 (see page 22). The price and quantity elasticities are uncompensated and
calculated at mean budget shares. The signs for the income, scale, and own-price and
own-quantity elasticities are the same across models, except for the scale elasticity for
apples, but the values are quite different in some cases, suggesting, in particular, that
restrictive models (12) and (13) may be misleading in the present case. Focusing on
model (15), the income elasticities for the two types of citrus exceed 3, indicating
quite large income impacts on fresh citrus prices, while that for grapes is 1.36, indicating a relatively large income impact on the quantity demanded of this fruit; the
income elasticity for apples was .79, and that for bananas was .13 but insignificant.
The scale elasticities were all negative or insignificant, indicating that a one percent
increase in the size of the bundle of citrus fruit results in .90 percent and .68 percent
decreases in the prices of oranges and grapefruit, respectively, and a .15 percent decrease in the quantity demanded of bananas. The demands for apples, bananas, and
grapes are price inelastic, with estimated own-price elasticities of -.44, -.32, and -.31,
respectively. The own quantity elasticities for oranges and grapefruit were -.96 and .56, respectively.
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Summary

T

between mixed demand and the
underlying direct and indirect utility functions. A mixed demand system was
derived from the original mixed demand objective function discussed by Samuelson
(1965) – the direct and indirect utility functions were simultaneously maximized
subject to a budget constraint, and from the total differential of the first-order
conditions a mixed demand system was obtained. The model embeds the direct and
inverse Rotterdam models as special cases, and its coefficients are directly related to
the underlying utility functions. These relationships can be useful in interpreting
mixed demand estimates, and allow straightforward analysis of separability and similar utility-based restrictions. Various restrictive specifications of mixed demand were
considered and illustrated in a study of fresh fruit demand.
HIS STUDY HAS FOCUSED ON THE RELATIONSHIP
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Table 1. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Mixed Demand for Fresh Fruit
Mixed Demand Assumption
Coeff.a
φ
θ1
θ2
θ3
γ4
γ5
П11
П12
П13
П22
П23
П33
α44
α45
α55
k or k1b
k2
k3
Log
Likelihood
a
b

Preference Independence
Standard
Estimate
Error
-0.698
0.099
0.369
0.072
0.167
0.028
0.124
0.041
-0.287
0.048
-0.052
0.012

Block Independence
Standard
Estimate
Error
-1.463
0.566
0.405
0.069
0.176
0.038
0.262
0.057
-0.130
0.053
-0.027
0.012
0.057
0.033
-0.023
0.016
0.029
0.020
0.072
0.030
-0.021
0.014
0.033
0.019
0.113
0.039
-0.003
0.004
0.026
0.011

Block Dependence I
Standard
Estimate
Error
-0.860
0.440
0.092
0.069
0.013
0.020
0.072
0.052
-0.668
0.112
-0.155
0.035
0.084
0.062
-0.051
0.033
0.042
0.037
0.102
0.060
-0.040
0.028
0.057
0.039
0.133
0.075
-0.015
0.009
0.043
0.024
-0.486
0.141

Block Dependence II
Standard
Estimate
Error
-0.760
0.399
0.075
0.055
0.009
0.016
0.069
0.047
-0.664
0.094
-0.183
0.034
0.069
0.059
-0.056
0.039
0.052
0.043
0.083
0.053
-0.019
0.022
0.026
0.032
0.120
0.065
-0.018
0.011
0.046
0.026
-0.582
0.181
-0.785
0.210
-0.392
0.161

252.202

258.096

264.405

267.639

i = 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 for apples, bananas, grapes, oranges, and grapefruit, respectively.
k for block dependence I; k1 for block dependence II.
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Table 2. Mixed Demand Elasticity Estimates for Fresh Fruita
Mixed Demand Restriction
Dep.
Var.b

Indep.
Var.b

Preference
Independence

P. Apples

-0.837

-0.645

-0.538

Std.
Error
0.159

-0.443

Std.
Error
0.146

P. Bananas

-0.115

0.033

-0.166

0.068

-0.087

0.073

-0.115

0.079

P. Grapes

-0.106

0.044

-0.341

0.081

-0.282

0.084

-0.232

0.077

Q. Grapefruit
Income
Scale

0.025

0.032

0.016

0.029

0.014

0.025

0.036

0.028

-0.030

0.010

-0.030

0.010

-0.073

0.020

-0.019

0.026

1.058

0.203

1.151

0.197

0.906

0.211

0.790

0.210

-0.006

0.033

-0.014

0.029

-0.059

0.028

0.018

0.044

-0.067

0.064

-0.124

0.119

0.121

0.137

0.139

0.130

0.089

-0.645

0.093

-0.439

0.104

-0.323

0.100

P. Grapes

-0.074

0.026

-0.007

0.086

0.115

0.093

0.044

0.078

0.017

0.022

0.010

0.019

0.003

0.006

-0.071

0.030

-0.021

0.006

-0.020

0.007

-0.016

0.016

-0.081

0.026

0.741

0.121

0.775

0.166

0.202

0.215

0.140

0.214

Scale

-0.004

0.023

-0.010

0.020

-0.013

0.014

-0.152

0.054

P. Apples

-0.060

0.060

-0.719

0.177

-0.673

0.182

-0.715

0.225
0.139

P. Bananas

-0.072

0.024

-0.148

0.116

-0.122

0.116

-0.332

P. Grapes

-0.532

0.170

-0.523

0.155

-0.519

0.151

-0.312

0.152

0.015

0.020

0.019

0.034

0.020

0.036

0.019

0.046

-0.019

0.008

-0.036

0.013

-0.106

0.031

-0.076

0.042

0.664

0.216

1.390

0.299

1.314

0.296

1.359

0.354

Scale

-0.003

0.021

-0.018

0.036

-0.086

0.043

-0.057

0.070

P. Apples

-0.145

0.141

0.180

0.143

-1.292

0.326

-1.313

0.262

P. Bananas

-0.175

0.053

0.025

0.085

-0.985

0.224

-1.014

0.182

P. Grapes

-0.161

0.067

0.145

0.099

-0.621

0.176

-0.582

0.134

Q. Oranges

-1.093

0.117

-1.063

0.126

-1.036

0.099

-0.957

0.113

Q. Grapefruit

-0.046

0.014

-0.021

0.024

0.107

0.026

0.056

0.024

1.480

0.217

0.651

0.284

3.898

0.711

3.910

0.547

-1.139

0.122

-1.084

0.122

-0.929

0.092

-0.901

0.108

Q. Oranges
Q. Grapefruit
Income

Income
Scale
P. Apples

-0.072

0.072

0.101

0.079

-0.818

0.231

-0.985

0.205

P. Bananas

-0.087

0.030

0.014

0.048

-0.624

0.160

-0.761

0.133

P. Grapes

-0.080

0.036

0.081

0.056

-0.393

0.123

-0.436

0.118

Q. Oranges

-0.084

0.023

0.000

0.071

-0.047

0.107

-0.120

0.121

Q. Grapefruit

-0.248

0.045

-0.609

0.090

-0.541

0.085

-0.556

0.076

1.239

0.116

0.804

0.156

2.834

0.506

3.182

0.439

-0.332

0.064

-0.610

0.109

-0.588

0.101

-0.676

0.095

Income
Scale
a

Est.

-0.600

Income

P. Grapefruit

Est.

P. Apples

Q. Grapefruit

P. Oranges

Est.

P. Bananas
Q. Oranges

Q. Grapes

Block
Dependence II

Std.
Error
0.155

Q. Oranges

Q. Bananas

Block
Dependence I

Std.
Error
0.156

Est.
Q. Apples

Block
Independence

Estimated at mean budget shares: 0.347, 0.224, 0.186, 0.177, and 0.065 for apples, bananas, grapes,
oranges, and grapefruit, respectively.
b
“Q” for quantity and “P” for price.
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Appendix
In terms of matrices, the differential mixed demand system can be written as
[π^a q^a][q^a-1dqa] =

(A1)

[φab-1π^a Uaa-1πa] (-qa′π^a π^a-1dπa -πb′q^b q^b-1dqb) +
λφab([φab-1π^aUaa-1π^a] - [φab-1π^aUaa-1πa][ φab-1πa′Uaa-1π^a] [φab-1π^a Uaa-1πa][ φab-1qb′Ψbb-1q^b][- λ-1q^b-1 Ψab π^a])[π^a-1dπa] +
λφab(-[φab-1π^aUaa-1π^a][ λ-1π^a-1Uabq^b] + [φab-1π^aUaa-1πa][ φab-1πa′Uaa-1π^a][ λ-1π^a-1Uabq^b] +
[φab-1π^aUaa-1πa][ φab-1qbφΨbb-1q^b])[q^b-1dqb]
and
[q^bπ^b][π^b-1dπb] =
[φab-1q^b Ψbb-1qb](qa′π^aπ^a-1dπa + πb′q^b q^b-1dqb) +
λφab([φab-1q^b Ψbb-1q^b][- λ-1q^b-1Ψabπ^a] + [φab-1q^bΨbb-1qb][ φab-1πa′Uaa-1π^a] +
[φab-1q^bΨbb-1qb][ φab-1 qb′Ψbb-1q^b][- λ-1q^b-1Ψabπ^a]) [π^a-1dπa ] +
λφab(-[φab-1q^bΨbb-1q^b] - [φab-1q^bΨbb-1qb] [φab-1πa′Uaa-1 π^a][ λ-1π^a-1Uab q^b] [φab-1q^bΨbb-1qb][ φab-1qb′ Ψbb-1q^b])[q^b-1dqb].

(A2)

